

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

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23 Nov 59

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : The Director

DATE: 20 Nov. 1959

FROM :

DWD/

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SUBJECT: Mr. McCone has the original of the memorandum, which I prepared after the conversation, and he is giving it to Mr. Reichardt, Chief of the Division of Intelligence. It should probably be kept within the Agency, and limited in distribution, at least unless clearance is sought from Mr. McCone. Some of the salient eve of

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19 November 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Conversation Between Chairman John A. McCone, AEC, and Professor V. S. Emelyanov, 19 November 1959

NOTE: The statements given in quotation marks are not a verbatim account, but do represent the interpreter's attempt to reconstitute immediately afterwards as precisely as possible the exact statements made.

1. Stalin's Policy and Khrushchev's New Line

"Stalin's policy was one of expansion by armed force, he put everything in the armed forces, so it is only natural that suspicions arose in the West. But now Khrushchev pursues a radically changed policy. I wouldn't be surprised to see a number of further changes in theoretical propositions in the light of this change of line."

"Khrushchev's new policy is based on three basic premises: (1) the eventual victory of Communism throughout the whole world, but by the decision of each people, not by force; (2) the avoidance of war at all costs; and (3) the fastest development of economic potentialities in the USSR. We have no need for external markets or raw materials, we have plenty of everything we need in the Soviet Union."

"Stalin's policy was a departure from the policy of Lenin. Lenin said that revolution cannot be exported in bayonets. But Stalin only believed in force."

"I myself was uncertain whether the new policy was genuine or a maneuver. It was necessary for me to know, so I discussed it with Khrushchev and the Presidium. I am now completely convinced that it is genuine and that Khrushchev is sincere."

E. R. J. H.

[Why do so many old apparat hands have a voice?] "Khrushchev can't decide every detail, and can't follow through on all details of policy and negotiation."

3. Nuclear Test Ban and Disarmament

Chairman McCone raised the questions of disarmament and nuclear test suspension for frank, informal, and unofficial discussion. Emelyanov was quite ready to discuss them.

McCone noted that due to existing mutual suspicions and tensions, it was necessary to have inspection and controls corresponding to each degree of disarmament or test ban, so that nothing would be dependent solely upon confidence in the other side, and so that no opponents of the measures could claim that the other side might be evading its terms. We must, stated McCone, take into account who will follow Khrushchev and Eisenhower. Thus it is necessary to have controls so that there is no ground for possible suspicions to develop. Eventually confidence will grow. In the US, for example, we are not concerned about who follows MacMillan or the Canadian prime minister. The attitudes of our peoples are such that no one could create difficulties between them in half a century. But we are not now yet able to hold this attitude about one another.

McCone further suggested the need for meetings by scientists and technical specialists to reach agreements on levels of controls corresponding to levels of prohibition on testing; for example, if one control station on the other's territory and one on-site inspection per year was sufficient to detect any tests above 500 KT, and if this was all the USSR was ready to agree to, then let us agree on that. If 20 control stations and 100 inspections per year allowed all weapons above 10 KT or all atmospheric weapons to be banned under controls, then let us agree to that. The main things are controls corresponding to the measures to be taken, relief of public concern over radiation effect from atmospheric testing, and to make a start which can be built upon for further test limitations and disarmament.

Emelyanov said that while he was not engaged in this matter, he had followed it closely. He stated that he agreed in general with this entire approach, and said that immediately upon his return he would take up with the Government these ideas of Mr. McCone. He offered no objections or counter-suggestions.

At another point, Emelyanov stated that he now better understood American reasons for favoring Project Plowshare, after talks with Dr. Teller and Dr. Weinberg and his visit to Los Alamos. He confessed to having had some strong suspicions before which were now changed. He did not, however, state that he now favored or agreed to support peaceful explosions.

Emelyanov stated that "some" had favored agreeing to a ban on atmospheric tests on the grounds that the U. S. would not go along. He agreed with Mr. McCone, however, that proposals should never be made on the premise or certainty that the other side would not accept them.

4. Providing Information as a Test of Confidence

Emelyanov stated that he assumed that Mr. McCone had asked the questions on production and reserves at the Soviet uranium mine not because of great interest in the data, but because of wanting to test confidence. And on these grounds he presented the matter to the Presidium and got agreement to provide the information.

Mr. McCone commented that he had needed no earnest of Emelyanov's sincerity, but that it was a matter on which we had given them the parallel information, and that he did regard it in a way as a matter of confidence on the part of the Soviet Government. He was glad that Emelyanov had brought the information.

Emelyanov said that this had been his understanding.

5. Secrecy and Security

On the question of Soviet security policy, Emelyanov stated that he himself was sure Khrushchev really meant that when there would be complete disarmament, there would be no secrecy at all, and anyone could go anywhere in the USSR. Indeed, he said, I really believe it will be easier for us than for you, because we have no production secrets from competitor concerns.

The only reason for secrecy on industrial and atomic matters, etc., is defense security. We keep only two kinds of data secret - overall production of some items, and location of some installations. We do not have technological secrets as such. We could take you almost anywhere, if we took you there blindfolded. But we learned with Germany that we must keep such things secret so long as there is the possibility of war.

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6. On Mutual Suspicion

Concerning the consequences of mutual suspicion, Emelyanov told the following story. At the close of the first Geneva Conference on atomic energy, when Mr. Lodge presented the summary minutes for approval, Emelyanov read them and found no objection. However, when he discussed them with the Soviet political advisors, they asked him how he could approve so readily a document submitted by the Americans since it must have concealed hostile designs. Thereupon, Emelyanov reviewed it a second time and, recalling that someone had proposed the creation of an international scientific journal, simply in order to offer any amendment to the American draft, he proposed including reference to a suggestion for such a journal. When this amendment was advanced, the Americans vigorously opposed it. Discussion of the Soviet amendment consumed three days. Allies of each side took positions in support or objection to the amendment along lines of their political positions. Finally at a dinner, the question arose and Emelyanov mentioned that the proposal for a journal had initially come not from him, but from Sir John Cockcroft of the UK. Cockcroft, who was present, admitted that he wasn't sure, but might have been the one to suggest it at the conference. Emelyanov offered to drop the amendment and at this point the Americans stated that they no longer had any objection to it. After the Americans had dropped their objection, Soviet political officers were very surprised and asked Emelyanov what sort of fly had bitten the Americans to get them to change their position. The amendment was made; but nothing further was ever done about a journal.

Emelyanov considered this an example of the kinds of difficulties and complications which arose solely on the basis of mutual suspicions.